Sealing yes, opening no
The platform only holds the public part of the key. The private part is created once and immediately overwritten server-side. Taking over the platform gains an attacker no emergency package at all.
The plan you reach without a network, without servers and without us
Emergency plans have an awkward property: they usually sit in exactly the system that is unreachable when it matters. The emergency kit is built for the case where platform and data centre are encrypted. The crisis team then reaches emergency and recovery plans without a network and without servers, along with the BIA including RTO and RPO, backup plans with storage location and restore procedure, asset, rack and network inventory, the firewall rule set, contact details and the released documents in the original. The threat model behind it is unusual but consistent: in an emergency the platform itself counts as compromised. It can therefore seal packages and open none of them.
The platform only holds the public part of the key. The private part is created once and immediately overwritten server-side. Taking over the platform gains an attacker no emergency package at all.
The package holds no password but the place of custody: which envelope, which safe, which person. The organizational question stays organizationally solved.
From BIA timings, dependencies and the power chains and rack positions in DCIM, a cold-start plan for the data centre is derived, with critical path and cumulative recovery time.
Three test types with clear meaning: verify the signature, open the package for a test, run a timed exercise. Only the opening test finds the case where the file is flawless and the device key is gone.
Emergency readiness you can evidence: not the assurance that a package exists, but the measured time until someone has opened it.
Schedule a no-obligation demo – we will show you the module with your own use cases.